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課程名稱 |
形上學專題：因果
Topics in Metaphysics：Causation |
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開課學期 |
104-1 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
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課號 |
Phl7777 |
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課程識別碼 |
124EM7570 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期四3,4,5(10:20~13:10) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室一 |
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備註 |
本課程以英語授課。B領域。
總人數上限：15人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1041causation |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
The course aims to introduce students to the literature in analytic metaphysics concerning theories of causation. The course will be divided into two parts. In the first part, we will go through the basic discussions about causation around 1970s-1980s, focusing especially on Lewis’s counterfactual approach and Salmon’s probabilistic approach. This will be the background against which further studies and discussions can be undertaken. In the second part, we will select topics and readings from some recent developments in the literature of causation. This includes the manipulation theory of causation developed by Woodward and Hitchcock; the process theory developed by Dowe; and the causal modeling approach developed by Pearl. Some related topics will also be considered, including the direction of causation, the metaphysics of causal powers, causal decision theory, etc.
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課程目標 |
Students will be expected to
(1) have a comprehensive understanding of various theories of causation;
(2) have some understanding of the issues concerning causation; and
(3) develop their own position about causation |
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課程要求 |
Each week, a paper in the selected topic will be discussed in the class. Each student is required to introduce at least one paper during the course and present his own comments on it. But all students are required to read the assigned paper in advance and submit two essays on the selected topics. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Main texts:
1. Collins, J., Hall, E. J., and Paul, L. A. Causation and counterfactuals. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Causation.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70(17):556–567.
3. Salmon, W. C. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.
4. Pearl, J. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
5. Woodward, J. Making Things Happen : A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
6. Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., and Menzies, P. C. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. |
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參考書目 |
Suggested readings (upon selection):
1. Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and Determinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
2. Armstrong, D. M. ‘Dispositions Are Causes.’ Analysis, 1969, 30(1):pp. 23–26.
3. Aronson, J. L. ‘On the grammar of ‘cause’. Synthese, 1971, 22(3-4):414–430.
4. Beebee, H. Hume on causation. The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Routledge, 2006.
5. Beebee, H. Causation and Observation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 471–497.
6. Bennett, J. ‘Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1974, 4(2):381.
7. Bennett, J. ‘Event Causation: The Counterfactual Analysis.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 1987, 1:367–386.
8. Bird, A. ‘Dispositions and Antidotes.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, 48(191):227–234.
9. Bird, A. ‘Dispositional Expressions.’ In G. Russell and D. Fara, eds., The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Routledge, 2012, pp. 729–740.
10. Black, M. ‘Why Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause?’ Analysis, 1956, 16(3):pp. 49–58.
11. Cartwright, N. ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies.’ Nous, 1979, 13(4):pp. 419–437.
12. Cartwright, N. Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
13. Choi, S. and Fara, M. ‘Dispositions.’ In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2012 edition, 2012.
14. Collingwood, R. G. An Essay on Metaphysics. Philosophical essays. vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
15. Collins, J. ‘Preemptive Prevention.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97(4):223–234.
16. Davidson, D. ‘Causal Relations.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 1967, 64(21):691–703.
17. Davidson, D. ‘Laws and cause*.’ Dialectica, 1995, 49(2-4):263–280.
18. Dowe, P. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
19. Dowe, P. ‘Causal Processes.’ In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2008 edition, 2008.
20. Dummett, A. E. and Flew, A. ‘Symposium: Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 1954, 28:pp. 27–62.
21. Dummett, M. ‘Bringing About the Past.’ The Philosophical Review, 1964, 73(3):pp. 338–359.
22. Earman, J. ‘Causation: A Matter of Life and Death.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 1976, 73(1):pp. 5–25.
23. Eells, E. Probabilistic Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
24. Egan, A. ‘Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory.’ The Philosophical Review, 2007, 116(1):pp. 93–114.
25. Fair, D. ‘Causation and the Flow of Energy.’ Erkenntnis, 1979, 14(3):219–250.
26. Fine, K. ‘Critical Notice.’ Mind, 1975, 84(335):451–458.
27. Goodman, N. ‘The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 1947, 44(5):113–128.
28. Hall, N. ‘Causation and the Price of Transitivity.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97(4):198–222.
29. Hall, N. ‘Two Concepts of Causation.’ In J. Collins, E. J. Hall, and L. A. Paul, eds., Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 181–276.
30. Hitchcock, C. ‘Probabilistic Causation.’ In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2012 edition, 2012.
31. Hitchcock, C. and Woodward, J. ‘Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth.’ Nous, 2003, 37(2):181–199.
32. Horwich, P. ‘Lewis’s Programme.’ In E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 208–216.
33. Jeffrey, R. C. The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
34. Joyce, J. M. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
35. Lewis, D. ‘Causation.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70(17):556–567.
36. Lewis, D. ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.’ Nous, 1979, 13(4):455–476.
37. Lewis, D. ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1979, 8(3):pp. 235–240.
38. Lewis, D. ‘Causal Decision Theory.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1981, 59(1):5–30.
39. Lewis, D. ‘Causal Explanation.’ In D. Lewis, ed., Philosophical Papers Vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 214–240.
40. Lewis, D. ‘Causation as Influence.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97(4):182–197.
41. Mackie, J. L. The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1974.
42. Manley, D. and Wasserman, R. ‘On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals.’ Mind, 2008, 117(465):59–84.
43. Martin, C. B. ‘Dispositions and Conditionals.’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 1994, 44(174):pp. 1–8.
44. McDermott, M. ‘Redundant Causation.’ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1995, 46(4):523–544.
45. Mellor, D. H. ‘In Defense of Dispositions.’ The Philosophical Review, 1974, 83(2):pp. 157–181.
46. Mellor, D. H. The facts of Causation. International library of philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1995.
47. Menzies, P. and Price, H. ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality.’ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1993, 44(2):pp. 187–203.
48. Paul, L. A. ‘Counterfactual Theories.’ In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. C. Menzies, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 158–184.
49. Price, H. ‘Against Causal Decision Theory.’ Synthese, 1986, 67(2):pp. 195–212.
50. Price, H. Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
51. Prior, E. W., Pargetter, R., and Jackson, F. ‘Three Theses about Dispositions.’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 1982, 19(3):pp. 251–257.
52. Psillos, S. Causation and Explanation. Chesham: Acumen, 2002.
53. Salmon, W. C. ‘Probabilistic Causality.’ In Causality and Explanation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980/1998, pp. 208–232.
54. Salmon, W. C. ‘Causality Without Counterfactuals.’ Philosophy of Science, 1994, 61(2):297–312.
55. Schaffer, J. ‘Trumping Preemption.’ The Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97(4):165–181.
56. Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. Causation. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
57. Suppes, P. A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1970.
58. von Wright, G. H. Explanation and Understanding. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971.
59. Weirich, P. ‘Causal Decision Theory.’ In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2012 edition, 2012.
60. Woodward, J. and Hitchcock, C. ‘Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account.’ Nous, 2003, 37(1):1–24.
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
9/17 |
Introduction |
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第2週 |
9/24 |
Lewis’s counterfactual theory |
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第3週 |
10/01 |
Criticisms of Lewis |
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第4週 |
10/08 |
Salmon’s probabilistic theory |
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第5週 |
10/15 |
Criticisms of Salmon |
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第6週 |
10/22 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第7週 |
10/29 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第8週 |
11/05 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第9週 |
11/12 |
Midterm presentations |
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第10週 |
11/19 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第11週 |
11/26 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第12週 |
12/03 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第13週 |
12/10 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第14週 |
12/17 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第15週 |
12/24 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第16週 |
12/31 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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第17週 |
1/07 |
Selected readings from the reading list |
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